The Distortion of Medicine and Confusion of Standards

The Distortion of Medicine, the Standard of Care, and Medical Community Norms; Alex DeLuca; War on Doctors/Pain Crisis; 2008-12-30. Revised: 2009-01-27 (footnote #4 inserted); 2009-02-19 (footnote #1 inserted).

Permalink: http://doctordeluca.com/wordpress/archive/distorted-confused-med-standards/
See also:
raw video footage from (CEI) interview of Dr. DeLuca, March 2008:
The Distortion of Pain Medicine – part 1 of 6
and,
Medical Ethics and Red Flags – part 2 of 6
and,
Why I Don’t Practice Medicine, Anymore – part 5 of 6

In fields of medicine involving controlled substances, especially addiction medicine and pain medicine, the doctor-patient relationship has become distorted. This distortion is complex and can be gross or subtle. Examples include a blanket refusal to prescribe controlled substances even when clearly indicated, or selecting less effective and more toxic non-controlled medications when a trial of opioid analgesics would be in the best interests of a particular patient.

One manifestation of this distortion is the ‘chilling effect’ – the ‘chilling effect’ is the withdrawal, for fear of litigation or loss of livelihood, by physicians, from the appropriate treatment of pain.¹ The chilling effect on appropriate pain management leads inexorably to the national problems of the undertreatment of pain² and the shortage of physicians knowledgeable and experienced in opioid therapy for chronic pain, and willing to provide this legitimate professional service. At the very least, some degree of suspicion and mistrust will surely arise in any medical relationship involving controlled substances.³

In most medical fields we could say: “How most reputable physicians practice approaches the (textbook) standard of care.” For common medical conditions (not involving controlled substances) the quality of care most physicians provide is fairly close to the medical standard of care which is what the textbooks say one should do, and which is generally in line with core medical ethical obligations such as holding the interests of the individual patient before you above all other interests, patient confidentiality, etc. For example, the care a person would receive for an acute asthma attack is pretty much the same no matter what ER he walked into, and that care would be pretty much by-the-book.

This is NOT true in the fields of addiction and pain medicine. For example, modern pain management textbooks universally recommend ‘titration to effect’ (simplistically: gradually increasing the opioid dose until the pain is relieved or until untreatable side effects prevent further dosage increase) as the procedure by which one properly treats chronic pain with opioid medications.⁴ Yet the overwhelmingly physicians in America do not practice titration to effect, or anything even vaguely resembling it, for fear of becoming ‘high dose prescriber’ targets.

In pain medicine we have the deeply disturbing situation that what most doctors do (medical community norm) is at odds with, and clearly below, the medical standard of care. Literally, in the treatment of chronic pain, an ethical physician attempting to practice in good faith, according to the clinical literature, is an outlier deviating from how most reputable physicians would practice.

For a stark example, Brown and colleagues reported, at a National Institute on Drug Abuse symposium in April 2001, on a survey they developed that measured the prescribing practices for benzodiazepines and for opioid analgesics by groups of physicians in response to variations of a single presented case. The physicians’ prescribing decisions were then compared with recommendations from a panel of pain management experts. They found that while the expert panel recommended that virtually all patients with [common idiopathic back pain] who do not respond to other treatments be given an opioid analgesic, only 20% of physicians said they would actually write that prescription.⁵

Where some medical board investigators and prosecutors err, in cases involving opioid prescribing, is in confusing or conflating the concepts: “medical standard of care,” on the one hand, and “community norms of medical practice,” on the other. Physicians willing to testify that they couldn’t conceive of writing this or that prescription, or that the defendant’s prescriptions were ‘absurd’ or ‘outrageous’ or ‘outside the bounds of legitimate medical practice’ are often not in fact testifying to the medical standard of care, but rather to what they conceive of as the medical community norm – what they think most reputable physicians in the community would do.

The “Reasonable Physician” Standard. While drug war prosecutors invariably attempt to confuse juries and journalists, and usually succeed, regarding this crucial difference between the ‘medical standard of care’ and ‘community norms of medical behavior,’ that difference is in fact very clearly drawn, as a matter of both medical ethics and precedence in criminal law. As Ben Rich explains in “Medical Custom and Medical Ethics: Rethinking the Standard of Care” (citation/abstract – full text PDF):

“When credible evidence has been presented that not just a particular physician, or an isolated, retrograde group of them, but a majority of the profession has failed to adopt practices that would materially reduce patient suffering, courts may properly conclude, in the tradition of great justices like Holmes and Hand, that a reasonable physician would not practice in this way and those who do should be called to account for the adverse consequences such practice has on the well-being of patients.”⁶ (emphasis mine)

Footnotes